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Abstract:
In this paper, we expose the results of a voting experiment realised in 2007, 
during the French Presidential election. This experiment aimed at confronting 
the Single Transferable Vote (SVT) procedure to two criteria: simplicity and 
the  selection  of  a  Condorcet-winner.  Building  on  our  electoral  sample's 
preferences, we show that this voting procedure can design a different winner, 
depending  on  the  vote  counting  process.  With  the  vote  counting  process 
advocated by Hare, the winner is Nicolas Sarkozy,  while the Coombs vote 
counting process has François Bayrou as winner. For these two vote counting 
processes, the details of the experiment are the same and it is shown that the 
simplicity  criterion  is  respected.  However,  with  regard  to  the  Condorcet-
winner criterion, the Coombs method is the only one to elect the Condorcet-
winner, i.e. François Bayrou.
JEL classification : C93, D72
Keywords  :  Field experiments,  Elections,  Single Transferable  Vote,  Voting 
system, Condorcet Winner
Résumé:
Dans  cet  article  nous  présentons  les  résultats  d'une   expérience  électorale 
réalisée  durant  l'élection  présidentielle  de  2007 qui  avait  pour  objectifs  de 
confronter le vote préférentiel transférable à deux critères : la simplicité et la 
sélection du vainqueur de Condorcet. A partir du profil des préférences des 
électeurs qui ont participé à cette expérience électorale,  nous montrons que 
cette  procédure  de  vote  peut  conduire   à  la  désignation  d'un  vainqueur 
différent suivant la mèthode de dépouillement employée. Avec la méthode de 
Hare, le vainqueur est  N. Sarkozy, tandis que la méthode de Coombs conduit 
à l'élection de F. Bayrou. Pour ces deux méthodes, les modalités pratiques du 
scrutin restent les mêmes et l'expérience a montré que ce processus répond 
bien au critère de simplicité. Par contre, au regard du principe de Condorcet, 
seule  la  méthode  de  Coombs,  pour  ce  profil  des  préférences  a  conduit  à 
l'élection du vainqueur de Condorcet, à savoir F. Bayrou.
JEL classification : C93, D72
Mots clés :   Economie expérimentale, Elections, Vote préférentiel transférable, 
Mode de scrutin, Vainqueur de Condorcet.
2Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2009.67
Good sense is, of all things among men, 
the most equally distributed; for everyone thinks 
himself to be so abundantly provided with it, that 
even those who are the most difficult to satisfy in 
everything  else  do  not  usually  desire  a  larger 
measure of this quality than they already possess. 
In  this  matter,  it  is  not  likely  that  everyone  is 
mistaken: this  is  rather  a  testimony  that  the 
power of judgment and distinguishing right from 
wrong  is  actually  what  we  call  good  sense  or 
reason,  and  this  is  naturally  equal  in  all  men 
(…)” 
Descartes, 1637, Discourse on Method, §1-1
A number of electoral experiments have recently been conducted, notably in 
France, with the aim of testing current electoral systems, and showing the qualities of 
alternative ones. For example, Baujard and Higersheim (2007) conducted experiments 
on  ranked  choice  voting  and  approval  voting,  which  allow voters  to  express  the 
intensity of their preferences. In addition, Balinski and Laraki (2007, a & b) tested the 
majority judgment system, in which voters can judge the degree to which they believe 
a candidate would be suited to take on the role of president. Furthermore, Lewis-Beck 
and Wittrock (2007) show how a two-round electoral system can be more favorable to 
extremist  candidates  than  a  one-round  system,  confirming  an  interest  in  studying 
other electoral systems. 
The  results  of  the  experiments,  also  confirmed  by  theoretical  results  (cf. 
Nurmi, 2002), show that no two electoral systems are equal. Thus, when there is only 
one seat to be filled (in a presidential election, for example), the use of a two-round 
majority electoral system leads voters to make a choice in the second round, based on 
a reduced political selection compared to the first round. Voters’ powers are therefore 
largely  reduced  in  this  case,  a  fact  that  was  initially  signaled  by  Hare  in  1873, 
defending an electoral  system that  we now know as the Single  Transferable  Vote 
(STV). Under this voting procedure, in which only one round is necessary, the voter is 
asked to rank all candidates, or a selection of them, by order of preference. According 
to  Hare  (1973),  this  voting  procedure  brings  “to  the  duty  of  voting  reflection, 
judgment and moderation,” and consequently, “by using the opportunity to separate, 
distinguish between and express every form of political opinion,” gives strength to the 
representative mandate.1
We can immediately note that such an electoral system is perfectly consistent 
with Descartes’ theory of shared good sense, and that it is possibly even easier for a 
voter to have to rank several candidates by order of preference, rather than having to 
1 For a detailed presentation, see Reilly and Maley (2000).
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select one amongst all those that present themselves. Grofman and Feld (2004) also 
show  formally  that  the  STV  satisfies  the  simplicity  criteria  better  than  the 
alternatives.2 Likewise, Farrel et al. (2000) show the practicality of such an electoral 
system, used in Australia since the beginning of the 20th century, in Ireland (where it 
has  been  applied  to  the  presidential  elections  since  1937)  and  at  the  heart  of 
professional  associations  (including  the  American  Psychological  Association). 
Despite  this,  many  opponents  to  the  adoption  of  this  system  say  that  the  single 
transferable vote appears too complicated. Grofman and Feld (2004, p.644, n. 11) also 
cite the fierce opposition displayed by the Mayor of San Francisco, although the local 
citizens voted to adopt this electoral system nonetheless, in a referendum in 2002. The 
advantages of the STV have again recently enabled its adoption elsewhere, in the city 
of Takoma Park (Maryland, United States, January 2007) and for the Scottish local 
elections in May 2007.
The first objective of this article is therefore, through an experiment on the 
French presidential election in 2007, to study whether the STV can offer a credible 
alternative to majority voting, in terms of simplicity from the voter’s point of view.
Apart from simplicity, a certain number of other criteria have been put forward 
and discussed in the literature on the subject, attempting to evaluate different electoral 
systems (cf. Nurmi, 2002, for a synopsis of electoral systems). Currently, amongst the 
most discussed criteria,  selecting the Condorcet winner and the idea of  Condorcet  
efficiency is probably fundamental. To recap, the Condorcet winner, if one exists, is 
the candidate against whom no other candidate is preferred. In bilateral opposition to 
each other candidate, he/she would be elected with a majority. An electoral system, 
which would systematically lead to the Condorcet winner being put at a disadvantage, 
would  in  all  likelihood  lead  to  a  rapid  reconsideration  of  the  country’s  political 
institutions. If such a difference between voters’ preferences and election results is not 
systematic with a majority vote, this electoral system does not however necessarily 
guarantee  that  the  Condorcet  winner  will  be  selected  (cf.  Saari,  1995,  but  this 
characteristic  had  already  been  shown in  Black,  1958). Indeed,  using  a  majority 
voting system, moderate candidates (potential Condorcet winners) are not necessarily 
an individual’s first choice. A majority voting system therefore does not allow them 
to influence the voting issue, in contrast to the transferable voting procedure, which 
allows voters’ preferences to be transferred from one candidate to another during the 
sequences (or repetitions) of the of the vote counting system.
However,  the  arguments  regarding  the  selection  of  the  Condorcet  winner 
remain  largely  theoretical. The  second  objective  of  this  article  is  also  to  use 
experiments to check whether the STV is effective in allowing the selection of the 
Condorcet winner, if one exists, and when the profile of people’s preferences does not 
necessarily correspond to the theoretical ideal of unimodal preferences. The difficulty 
of an electoral system using the single transferable vote is the creation of two distinct 
vote-counting methods, which can be used to choose the elected candidate: The Hare 
method  (or  ranked-choice  voting,  Hare,  1873)  and  the  Coombs’  method  (1964). 
Concerning  the  latter,  Grofman  and  Feld  (2004)  show that  the  Coombs’  method 
always leads to the Condorcet winner being elected, as long as the voters’ preferences 
are unimodal.
Our  electoral  experiment  therefore  aims  to  examine  the  qualities  of  an 
alternative electoral  system, which has greater respect for the series of preferences 
expressed by the electorate, when the single transferable vote is applied. It is shown 
2 See Laslier and Van der Straeten (2004, 2008) for an experiment showing that, in practice, approval 
votes equally satisfy the simplicity criteria.
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that the two criteria - simplicity and the selection of a Condorcet winner – can be 
checked for.
The article is organized as follows. In a first section, we present the single 
transferable vote and the counting method in detail, along with the practical details of 
the electoral  experiment  and the official  results. The second section confronts the 
initial results of the experimental vote and the simplicity criteria. The results using the 
Hare  vote  counting  method  are  outlined  in  the  third  section. The  fourth  section 
presents the results that  were obtained using the alternative vote counting method, 
namely that of Coombs. Finally, the last section studies the existence of a Condorcet 
winner. The  conclusion  summarizes  our  results  and  proposes  future  research 
possibilities.
1. The Single Transferable Vote
The term ‘single transferable vote’ in reality refers to two different processes, 
which can only be distinguished by the vote counting methods: The Hare method 
(ranked choice voting) and the Coombs’ method. The first is used for the presidential 
elections in Ireland and Sri Lanka, and was organized for the national elections on the 
islands of Fiji and Papua New Guinea at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 
2000s. Australia  has  used  ranked  choice  voting  for  elections  to  the  House  of 
Representatives  (or  Lower  House)  since  1918,  and  finally,  at  a  local  level,  this 
method has been employed for the San Francisco municipal elections since 2002. No 
examples exist showing the application of the Coombs’ method.
Whichever  of  the methods  is  applied,  voters  receive  a  single  ballot  paper, 
containing  the  names  of  each  candidate,  and  they  must  rank  them  in  order  of 
preference. Number 1 refers to the voter’s first choice, number 2 to the second, and so 
on. The voter is not forced to rank all of the candidates.3 Considering that the vote can 
be transferred to each candidate that the voter gives a rank for, the voter refusing to 
give a rank to a candidate means refusing to give that candidate a say at any point in 
the vote counting process. If no candidate wins the majority of the votes when they 
are counted (the number of votes corresponds to the number of ballot papers placing 
the candidate as first choice), the candidate with the worst result is then eliminated, 
and  votes  for  the  second  choice  candidate  on  each  paper  ranking  the  eliminated 
candidate as first choice are then transferred to that candidate. This process is then 
repeated until one candidate obtains more than half of the votes cast. The distinction 
that can be made between the Coombs’ and Hare methods is based on the way of 
defining the candidate with the worst result (see below and Grofman and Feld, 2004).
Compared  to  a  two-round  electoral  system,  one  of  the  advantages  of  this 
system is that it avoids voters going back to the polls, as all preferences are expressed 
from the first  and only round. It  thus allows the voter  to fully express his or her 
preferences between all listed candidates. The single transferable vote is based on the 
largest  possible  electoral  participation,  avoiding  supporters  of  lesser  candidates 
refusing to take part in the second of a two-round system. On the other hand, ranked 
choice voting could potentially allow the election of a candidate representing the first 
choice of a small portion of the electorate. Therefore it does not necessarily favor the 
“larger parties.” As it is based on initial preferences, voters’ choices are, by definition, 
3 This point does however vary between elections. In the Australian case, the voter must complete the 
entire ballot, but in San Francisco, the voter only needs to rank three candidates.
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not influenced by the first-round results, and therefore by the opinions of other voters 
which were expressed in the first round. As the voters have to make their choices just 
once  and  allow  their  vote  to  be  transferred  to  the  other  ranked  candidates,  this 
electoral  system greatly reduces voters’ incentives to not vote sincerely.  However, 
this electoral  system does not completely eliminate the possibility of manipulation 
(insincere voting, cf. Peress, 2008).
A final advantage to this voting procedure, whichever vote counting method is 
applied, is that, as the two-round electoral system, it produces a majority winner. 
One  has  to note  one  inherent  difficulty  with  this  electoral  process: vote-
counting stations. The votes in this system, in contrast to the current two-round voting 
system,  cannot  be  counted  in  local  offices4,  with  the  national  result  being  the 
aggregate results of all local offices. With the single transferable vote, the sum of all 
vote counts in each counting station does not lead to the same result as the count on 
the total number of ballot papers from the entire electoral district. The count should be 
made  only  once  and  at  a  district  level,  whichever  counting  method  is  applied. 
Furthermore, as all ballot papers ranking an eliminated candidate as first choice need 
to  be  reprocessed,  the  counting  process  is  strongly  facilitated  through the  use  of 
information technology,  as soon as the number of voters increases. Equally,  voters 
could find this system more complicated than the current electoral  system. On the 
face  of  it,  choosing  one single  candidate  can  seem easier  than  selecting  a  list  of 
candidates and ranking them by order of preference. However, as we will see, this 
suggestion seems to have only a weak empirical impact.
1.1. The Hare Method (Ranked Choice Voting)
According to this method, the worst result will be defined based on the way in 
which  support can be brought together: The candidate  with the lowest number  of 
votes as first choice is eliminated, and these votes are then recounted and passed on to 
the  candidate  which  the  voter  placed  as  second  choice  on  the  ballot  paper. If  a 
candidate receives the majority of votes as a result of this transfer, she is elected. 
Otherwise, the process will be repeated until a majority winner is identified (Hare, 
1873, Farrell et al. 1996).
This electoral system is therefore based on relative opinions, as is the majority 
electoral system. In general, but not systematically, it leads to similar results, as the 
vote-counting method is actually very similar to that of a two-round electoral system. 
In the counting procedure, the later repetitions can be seen as another fictional voting 
round in the electoral process. The worst candidate is eliminated in each  round. As 
voters express the order of their preferred candidates, they are not required to return to 
vote again in further rounds. The only task to be done between each of these virtual 
voting  rounds is  to  alter  the ballot  papers,  transferring  the  votes  to  the  candidate 
immediately following the eliminated candidate, and to keep a score for each of the 
candidates who remain on the list. In the 2007 French presidential election, a two-
round electoral system, the 10 worst candidates were eliminated between the first and 
second rounds, but with the single transferable vote, candidates are eliminated one at 
a time. Such a difference is not only formal, in certain configurations it can affect the 
final results of an election. This was the vote-counting method that was outlined in the 
letter to voters, used to announce and present the experiment.
4 Or simply for information, to know how voters in the area voted.
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1.2. Practical Details of the Electoral Experiment
The electoral experiment was conducted in two of the eleven voting districts in 
the town of Faches-Thumesnil: District no.1 (Ecole Pasteur-Curie) and district no. 6 
(Centre Médico-social). The voters in the two districts received a letter, signed by the 
Mayor of the town and the Dean of the Economic and Social Science Faculty (cf. 
Annex D). The letter informed voters that the experiment would take place during the 
first round of the presidential election, and of its practical details, also inviting them 
to  take  part. On  the  back  of  the  letter,  an  explanatory  note  presented  the  single 
transferable vote and how it works. After having voted, the voters were then invited to 
take part in the electoral experiment in a voting office adjacent to the official office. 
The voters taking part in the experiment were reminded orally of the practical details, 
just before they filled in their ballot papers. We reconstructed all characteristics of a 
real polling station, including booths, boxes and ballot papers (cf. Annex A).
1.3. The official and aggregated results of districts 1 and 6 in Faches-
Thumesnil
Considering that the voting procedure allows a second round of voting to be 
avoided,  the  experiment  naturally  took  place  on  April  22,  2007.  The  aggregated 
results of districts 1 and 6, shown in a table in Annex B, present the way in which the 
voters  cast  their  votes  for  all  presidential  candidates  in  the  official  election. The 
national results are also presented in the same table.
If we compare the results, we can see that participation was a little lower in the 
districts where the experiment took place, in both the first and second rounds, but the 
general results are very similar to those observed at a national level. The correlation 
coefficient between the two sets of results is greater than 0.99, showing that the two 
data  sets  are  practically  identical. Furthermore,  the  statistical  tests  that  were 
conducted do not show any significant difference between the two sets of results.
2. The single transferable vote and the simplicity criteria
If we look at the criteria, which are set out to define a “good” electoral system, 
it is clear that simplicity is essential if democracy is to work successfully. A relatively 
complicated  electoral  system could  eventually  hinder  universal  suffrage,  in  which 
case it would no longer be citizens that appear on a census who vote, but those who 
understand the sense, the practical details of an electoral system.
Analyzing the results of the experiment regarding the simplicity principle, we 
can  attempt  to  confirm  that  the  electoral  system  presented  to  voters  was  well 
understood, and the results have not been marred through misunderstandings. We can 
note  first  of  all  that  the  experiment  was  warmly  welcomed  by  the  voters  in  the 
districts involved, as 60.30% accepted to take part (cf. table 1). Among the ballots 
completed by voters, a little less than 7% proved to be blank or spoilt. However, to 
understand the participants’ level of comprehension of the proposed electoral system, 
a closer analysis of the blank and spoilt votes was conducted (cf. table 2). Amongst 
the blank and spoilt votes, around 3% were abusive, and around 12% were genuine 
blank votes. In total, these two categories represented 1.04% of votes, a rate which is, 
once again, very comparable with the complete sample of the two districts which took 
part, which received 1.51% of ballots as either blank or spoilt. The remainder of the 
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blank and spoilt ballots (85% of the blank or spoilt papers in our sample) were those 
on  which  the  voters  expressed  their  choices  with  a  simple  cross,  or  contained  a 
mistake in the ranking of candidates.5 These two error categories can be assimilated to 
a  lack  of  understanding  of  this  electoral  system  on  the  part  of  the  experiment’s 
participants. Therefore, mistakes made by participants represented a total of 5.94% of 
ballot papers. If this figure seems somewhat high, it is in fact relatively low when we 
consider  that  the  experiment  did  not  benefit  from  a  strong  mobilized  campaign, 
explaining the new voting system to voters (who received a letter one week before the 
election and then oral explanations at the polling station), which would be carried out 
if this electoral system were to be adopted. We can note that in Australia, a country 
where this electoral system has been used in legislative elections since the beginning 
of the century and where voting is obligatory, blank and spoilt votes accounted for 
3.8% of ballots in the 1998 election.
TABLE 1 – Participation in the electoral experiment
Number % of official votes
Voters 960 60.30
Number % of voters in experiment
Blank or Spoilt 67 6.98
Votes Cast 893 93.02
Number of ballots according to number of candidates ranked
Number of Number of in %
candidates ranked ballots
1 30 3.36
2 67 7.50
3 163 18.25
4 95 10.64
5 78 8.73
6 37 4.14
7 17 1.90
8 9 1.01
9 3 0.34
10 9 1.01
11 15 1.68
12 370 41.43
5 Some of the mistakes can be attributed to us. We neglected to precise in the letter addressed to the 
participants that ranking candidates with an equal number would not be allowed.
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TABLE 2 – Nature of blank and spoilt ballots.
Number in %
Abusive 2 2.99
Blank 8 11.94
Cross 22 32.84
Ranking 
error 35 52.54
Total 67 100
One characteristic of this electoral system, which can appear complex at first 
sight, is the requirement to rank (all or some of) the candidates. From this point of 
view, the results are again reassuring. Indeed, if we count the ballots in terms of the 
number of candidates ranked, we see a bimodal distribution, with a first peak between 
3 and 4 ranked candidates (18.25% and 10.64% of ballots respectively,  cf. table 1) 
and a second peak at 12 candidates, with more than 41% of voters. This result shows 
without question that a large number of voters did not find it prohibitive to rank the 
candidates in this way, only 3.36% of voters ranked only one candidate. However, 
this does not necessarily signify that the choice to rank only one candidate means the 
voter has difficulty in ranking a certain number of candidates, as it could represent a 
sincere vote (one single candidate deserves their vote, and they will not allow it to be 
eventually transferred to another candidate during the counting process).
Finally, it would appear that the level of mistakes and blank votes is relatively 
low, and that the need to rank candidates did not create a barrier against participation 
in  this  electoral  system. Coupled  with  voters’  high  level  of  participation  in  this 
experiment,  the results lead us to consider that the single transferable vote can be 
considered as a relatively simple, and therefore practical, electoral system. This result 
is  not  really  surprising when we consider  that  this  system has  been  in  place  and 
working  in  the  Australian  Lower  House  since  1918,  and  in  the  Irish  presidential 
elections since 1937.
3 The single transferable vote results (Hare method)
The first candidate to be eliminated is Gérard Schivardi (cf. table 3), as only a 
single voter cast him in first position (meaning that he received 0.11% of votes cast). 
This ballot indicated Olivier Besancenot as second choice candidate. With Schivardi 
eliminated, this voter’s choice is therefore transferred to Besancenot.6 After counting 
the votes (cf. table 3), Besancenot’s result now improves (passing from 6.49% after 
the  first  repetition  to  6.61%  after  the  second),  with  all  other  candidates’  scores 
remaining unchanged. In this second repetition,  the candidate with the worst score 
according to the Hare method is Frédéric Nihous. After this candidate is eliminated, 
the ballots placing him in first position have the votes transferred from this candidate 
to the candidate ranked in second position. After this transfer, we recount the votes 
received by each candidate to identify the one with the worst score (3rd repetition), 
and so on.
6 In annex C, we explain the manner in which votes are transferred during each repetition of the voting 
process, based on this ballot paper.
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TABLE 3 – vote count according to the Hare method.
Candidate Repetition (% of votes received)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Besancenot 6.49 6.61 6.72 7.17 7.17 7.74 8.98 10.5
9
12.4
2
- -
Buffet 2.13 2.13 2.24 2.24 2.24 2.81 3.37 - - - -
Schivardi 0.11 - - - - - - - - - -
Bayrou 21.1
6
21.1
6
21.2
8
21.6
4
21.9
7
22.4
5
22.7
8
22.8
6
23.2
5
27.4
5
-
Bové 1.68 1.68 1.68 - - - - - - - -
Voynet 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.24 2.24 - - - - - -
De Villiers 1.90 1.90 1.90 2.02 - - - - - - -
Royal 22.2
8
22.2
8
22.2
8
22.5
3
22.5
3
23.1
2
23.2
3
24.4
4
25.1
7
32 45.85
Nihous 0.45 0.45 - - - - - - - - -
Le Pen 6.72 6.72 6.83 6.84 7.51 7.52 7.52 7.77 - - -
Laguiller 2.24 2.24 2.24 2.47 2.58 2.58 - - - - -
Sarkozy 32.8
1
32.8
1
32.8
1
32.8
5
33.7
4
33.7
8
34.1
2
34.3
5
39.1
6
40.5
5
54.15
Using  this  procedure,  the  candidates  to  be  eliminated  after  Schivardi  and 
Nihous, in order,  are José Bové,  Philippe de Villiers,  Dominique Voynet7,  Arlette 
Laguiller, Marie-George Buffet, Jean-Marie Le Pen, Olivier Besancenot and François 
Bayrou. In the 10th repetition, at which point only three candidates remain (Bayrou, 
27.45%, Ségolène Royal, 32% and Nicolas Sarkozy, 40.55%), this method therefore 
eliminates Bayrou, who had received the least votes. Only Royal and Sarkozy remain 
on the list. After transferring votes cast  in favor of Bayrou,  this  counting method 
results in Sarkozy being elected with 54.15% of votes cast, against 45.85% of votes 
for Royal.
Therefore,  ranked choice voting (the single transferable vote with the Hare 
method) leads to a result, which is very similar to that obtained using the two-round 
system (the official vote). Both systems result in the same winner, Sarkozy, with very 
similar scores – Sarkozy achieving 53.38% in the official election and 54.15% in the 
experimental election, and 46.62% and 45.85% respectively for Royal.
This result is not really surprising, as numerous similarities exist between the 
two  electoral  systems,  a  fact  that  we already  developed  upon  in  the  section  that 
presented this method.
We can however go further in our analysis of the experimental election, on the 
one hand studying the composition of the electorate eventually voting for one of the 
two finalists, and on the other hand their levels of attraction, based on the ranking 
position which was ultimately given to them.
7 We can see that in this 5th repetition, Voynet shares the worst score with Buffet. They are in a dead 
heat in terms of votes; therefore we need to determine which one should be eliminated. The electoral 
process should define these criteria before the vote takes place. We envisaged two possible criteria: 
eliminate the candidate with the worst initial score (in the first round), in this case Voynet; or eliminate 
the candidate with the least number of second place votes in this 5th repetition (Voynet 34, Buffet 46). 
Voynet  is  therefore  eliminated,  whichever  of  the  criteria,  which  would  have  been  upheld  at  the 
beginning, is applied.
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The first column in table 4 corresponds to the distribution of the electorate 
whose votes were ultimately cast for Sarkozy, therefore finding themselves competing 
against Royal in the final repetition of the electoral process. Thus, 1.94% of Sarkozy’s 
voters (in the 11th repetition) initially wanted to vote for Besancenot (ranking him in 
first position on their ballots). More than 63% of them placed Sarkozy as first choice 
from the beginning, 9% initially preferred Le Pen, 3% de Villiers and more than 19% 
Bayrou. Almost 75% of his voters initially voted for a right-wing candidate (including 
him), or one from the extreme right. Including Bayrou, this figure reaches 95%.
TABLE 4 – Hare: distribution of voters who eventually voted for one of the 2 finalists
Initial intention (in %) Proportion of voters who
initially voted for (in %):
Sarkozy Royal Sarkozy Royal
Besancenot 1.94 10.97 15.52 74.14
Buffet 0.22 4.08 5.26 84.21
Schivardi 0.22 0 100 0
Bayrou 19.65 21.43 48.15 44.44
Bové 0.43 3.06 13.33 80
Voynet 0.65 3.32 16.67 72.22
De Villiers 3.02 0 82.35 0
Royal 0 50.77 0 100
Nihous 0.65 0 75 0
Le Pen 9.07 3.06 70 20
Laguiller 0.86 3.32 20 65
Sarkozy 63.28 0 100 0
Total 100 100 - -
If we now look at each candidate’s supporters, whose votes were eventually 
cast for Sarkozy instead, we find the information in the third column of table 4. Thus, 
15.52% of voters who ranked Besancenot as first choice (his supporters) indicated 
that they preferred Sarkozy to Royal, and therefore voted in his favor during the final 
run off between the two at the end of the process. In descending order8, the figure 
reaches almost 82% of de Villiers’ supporters, 75% of Nihous’, 70% of Le Pen’s, 
48% of Bayrou’s, then falling to 20% of Laguiller’s supporters, and finishing with 5% 
of Buffet’s.
Of the electorate voting for Royal at the end of the process, 50% of her voters 
had initially ranked her as first choice, 21% had initially ranked Bayrou as first choice 
and 10% for Besancenot. Interestingly, none of the voters who ranked de Villiers or 
Nihous in first position ranked Royal ahead of Sarkozy. In terms of the transfer (4th 
column), we see that, in descending order, almost 85% of voters who placed Buffet as 
first choice voted for Royal. This rate is as high as 75% of Besancenot’s supporters, 
72% of Voynet’s, 65% of Laguiller’s and 44% of Bayrou’s. It goes down to 20% in 
the case of Le Pen’s supporters.
The majority of voters (between 65% and 85%) who initially supported another left-
wing candidate transferred their vote to Royal rather than Sarkozy. On the contrary, 
none of de Villier’s or Nihous’ supporters eventually voted in favor of Royal.
8 In the case of Schivardi, the share is not of great significance, as only one single voter ranked this 
candidate in first position.
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We notice that,  if  we add up the numbers for each term in the second and 
fourth columns of table 4, the total does not reach 100%. The difference represents 
the proportion of voters who did not rank both Sarkozy and Royal, and therefore did 
not want for their vote to be transferred to one of the candidates against the other in 
the  counting  process. Thus,  48,15% of  voters  who ranked Bayrou  as  first  choice 
indicated  that  they  preferred  Sarkozy,  and  44.44% preferred  Royal,  meaning  that 
7.41% of them did not want their vote to be transferred two one of the two finalists 
chosen using this counting method.9
TABLE 5 – distributions of votes according to rankings, where the vote was 
eventually transferred to one of the two finalists.
Sarkozy Royal
Ballots classing them in position:
Number in % Number in %
1 293 63.28 199 50.77
2 132 28.51 96 24.49
3 18 3.89 30 7.65
4 5 1.08 29 7.4
5 4 0.86 9 2.3
6 0 0 8 2.04
7 3 0.65 5 1.28
8 3 0.65 3 0.77
9 2 0.43 3 0.77
10 1 0.22 7 1.79
11 2 0.43 3 0.77
12 0 0 0 0
Around 63% of the voters who eventually voted for Sarkozy ranked him as 
first choice, and more than 28% of them ranked him as second choice (cf. table 5). 
Thus, more than 90% of the electorate who voted for Sarkozy against Royal ranked 
him as either first or second choice on their ballot papers, representing a relatively 
high level of support.
Of  the  voters  who  indicated  in  their  ranking  that  they  preferred  Royal  to 
Sarkozy (meaning those that voted for her), 50% ranked her in first position and 25% 
in second position, a total of 75% for one of these two first positions. We need to go 
as far as the fourth position to reach 90% of the voters, which proves a lower level of 
support compared to that of Sarkozy.
4. The Coombs’ method 
It could be interesting to test the influence that the vote counting method has 
on  the  election  result.  However,  we  should  be  very  careful  when  applying  the 
Coombs’ method to the ballot papers completed during this electoral experiment. In 
truth, only the Hare method of vote counting was announced to voters (cf. the letter 
sent to voters, Annex D), and nothing can ensure that the voters taking part in the 
experiment would not have altered their ranking if a different counting method had 
9 These ballots are therefore considered to be blank votes for this final round, and they are no longer 
counted as votes cast. The number of votes cast therefore evolves (by falling) during the vote counting 
process.
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been  announced.  We  therefore  explicitly  assume  in  this  section  that  the  ranking 
choices expressed by voters were not affected by the counting method, and that voters 
gave their true preferences (no manipulation or strategic voting).
The  subjects  were  certainly  asked  to  rank  candidates  according  to  their 
preferences, given as an instruction in the explanatory note and on the ballot paper 
(see annexes A and D). This could be understood as asking voters to vote sincerely, as 
long as voters understand the instruction as being a necessity and not a guideline. Two 
remarks can be made on this point. 
Firstly,  it  could  be  argued  that  the  instructions  given  to  voters  should 
sufficiently  define  the electoral  system (meaning  that  they explain  how the ballot 
paper should be filled in), without indicating for whom the subjects of the experiment 
should vote. In addition, it is not necessarily shocking to ask voters to rank candidates 
according  to  their  preferences. In  fact,  if  this  reduces  voters’  tendencies  to  vote 
tactically  (as  a  form of  manipulation),  it  would  actually  improve  the  perspective 
usefulness  of  rankings  given  by  voters,  allowing  results  produced  by  different 
methods to be compared. 
Furthermore, the wording that was used attempted to explain to the subjects, 
who were just discovering this type of ballot paper, in the simplest possible way, how 
to cast their vote. 
Moreover, it should be recognized that in the framework of our experiment, 
the  single  transferable  vote  offered  voters  little  opportunity  for  manipulation. A 
voter’s incentive to manipulate the election is very small as soon as voters form a 
sufficiently large sample (becoming larger than a small group) and the candidates (or 
their  representatives)  are  unable  to  exert  their  influence  over  the  experiment’s 
participants. Manipulation is even less likely in our experiment as the electoral system 
which was tested had not previously been seen by the voters,  which rules out the 
possibility of people learning how to manipulate the system easily.
In  addition,  we  assume  that  voters,  when  asked  to  vote  by  ranking  the 
candidates, rank them according to their order of preference, without conducting an 
opinion poll. In fact, the communication of opinion poll results does not, in reality, 
only eliminate undecided voters; in addition they generally do not include all of the 
candidates in the election (cf. Abramson, 2007). Finally,  the ranking system which 
voters  are  asked for in  a  single  transferable  vote  is  advantageous  in  reducing the 
number of dead heats (as it asks voters to order their preferences), as opposed to an 
opinion poll or even approval voting (cf. Balinski and Laraki, 2007, a and b).10
The Coombs’ method (1964) is an alternative to that of Hare. The worst result, 
according  to  the  Coombs’  method,  is  defined  by  the  level  of  rejections that  a 
candidate and his manifesto accumulate. It uses a completely different philosophy to 
that which is prevalent in current electoral systems. Contrary to the Hare method, the 
operating  criterion  is  no  longer  the  level  of  support,  but  the  level  of  rejection. 
Concretely, during the first repetition, the candidate with the highest number of ballot 
papers  where  he/she  is  either  not  ranked  or  ranked  in  last  position  (the  twelfth 
position in this  case at  the time of the first  repetition)  is  eliminated,  and votes in 
his/her favor are transferred to the candidates  ranking in second position on those 
ballot papers. If a candidate receives the majority of votes as a result of this transfer, 
they are elected. Otherwise, a new repetition takes place, and the candidate who has 
the highest number of ballot papers where he/she is either not ranked or ranked in last 
position (the eleventh position in this case) is eliminated, and this process is repeated 
until  a  majority  winner  is  found.  Concerning  this  procedure,  one  of  its  main 
10 On this point, we thank Paul R. Abramson for his input.
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advantages is that it always leads to the Condorcet winner being elected, as long as 
the voters’ preferences are unimodal, as shown by Grofman and Feld (2004).
Using  this  vote  counting  method,  we  radically  change  philosophy,  as  the 
criteria for eliminating a candidate is no longer the level of support, but the level of 
rejections  level  that  a  candidate  and his  manifesto  accumulate. Concretely,  during 
each repetition,  the candidate  who has the highest  number  of ballot  papers where 
he/she is either not ranked or ranked in last position is eliminated.
According to this procedure, and therefore accepting the hypothesis of voters’ 
sincerity,11 the first candidate to be eliminated (cf. table 6) is no longer Schivardi, but 
Le Pen. Out of the 893 ballot papers, 549 voters did not rank him, or ranked him in 
12th position. The  order  of  elimination  during  the  course  of  the  repetitions  is  as 
follows: Schivardi, Nihous, de Villiers, Bové, Laguiller, Buffet, Voynet, Besancenot 
and Royal. With this method, the two finalists are Bayrou and Sarkozy. Indeed, even 
though Royal collected more support than Bayrou, 32% versus 27.45% respectively 
(cf. table 3 or table 7), she is eliminated because she received more rejections, with 
452  ballot  papers,  compared  to  395  for  Sarkozy  and  215  for  Bayrou.  The  latter 
appears to be the most consensual candidate, in other words the candidate collecting 
the least number of rejections.
TABLE 6 – vote count according to the Coombs’ method.
Candidate Repetition (% of votes received)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Number of ballots where the candidate was not ranked or ranked in last position.
Besancenot 345 347 351 354 357 373 403 439 517 - -
Buffet 390 395 400 401 407 425 454 - - - -
Schivardi 507 522 - - - - - - - - -
Bayrou 151 151 151 152 153 154 154 156 164 215
Bové 430 441 455 468 490 - - - - - -
Voynet 385 385 388 394 407 423 446 474 - - -
De Villiers 416 471 479 486 - - - - - - -
Royal 232 235 235 237 242 245 252 260 279 452 -
Nihous 471 482 490 - - - - - - - -
Le Pen 549 - - - - - - - - - -
Laguiller 430 445 448 454 468 494 - - - - -
Sarkozy 221 265 266 268 303 309 311 314 337 395 -
Table 7 shows the percentages of votes received by each candidate over the 
duration  of  the  repetitions. With  this  method,  the  two  finalists  are  Bayrou  and 
Sarkozy. In this configuration, it is Bayrou who is elected with 51.97% of the votes, 
against 48.08% for Sarkozy. 
The  choice  between  vote  counting  methods,  the  Hare  method  versus the 
Coombs’  method,  therefore  appears  to  be  pivotal  in  deciding  which  candidate  is 
elected. In our experiment, the Hare method leads to a final run-off between Sarkozy 
and Royal, with the former being the winner, but the Coombs’ method brings about a 
final confrontation between Sarkozy and Bayrou, with the latter being elected as the 
winner.
11 Testing the sincerity of voters in our sample is impossible in reality; our experiment takes place in 
the field, and not in a laboratory (in which case the initial allocations as well as participants’ profiles 
can  be  defined,  allowing  one  to  measure  the  difference  between  their  behavior and  their  “real” 
preferences).
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TABLE 7 – vote count according to the Coombs’ method – continued.
Candidate Repetition (% of votes received)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Votes received as % of all votes cast.
Besancenot 6.49 7.62 7.74 7.85 7.96 8.53 9.89 11.3
9
12.4
2
- -
Buffet 2.13 2.13 2.13 2.24 2.24 2.24 2.81 - - - -
Schivardi 0.11 0.11 - - - - - - - - -
Bayrou 21.1
6
21.4
1
21.4
1
21.5
2
21.8
6
22.2
2
22.7
0
22.7
7
23.2
5
27.4
5
51.97
Bové 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 - - - - - -
Voynet 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.24 2.36 2.59 - - -
De Villiers 1.90 2.13 2.13 2.13 - - - - - - -
Royal 22.2
8
22.7
6
22.7
6
22.8
7
22.8
7
23.1
2
23.3
7
24.2
4
25.1
7
32 -
Nihous 0.45 0.56 0.56 - - - - - - - -
Le Pen 6.72 - - - - - - - - - -
Laguiller 2.24 2.58 2.58 2.58 2.8 3.14 - - - - -
Sarkozy 32.8
1
37 37 37.1
1
38.4
5
38.5 38.8
8
39.0
1
39.1
6
40.5
5
48.03
This result shows that this method favors consensual candidates in the vote 
counting process, the one  that collects  the least rejections. Also, if we look at the 
results in the first column of table 6, we can see that the three candidates for whom 
the level of rejections (in the same sense as previously) is lowest for Bayrou (151 
ballots),  Sarkozy  (221  ballots),  and  Royal  (232  ballots). During  the  last  but  one 
repetition (the tenth), these are the exact candidates that remain on the list. The vast 
majority of Sarkozy’s supporters ranked Royal after Bayrou, and similarly Bayrou’s 
supporters  ranked Royal  after  Sarkozy,  although in a smaller  proportion,  and it  is 
therefore Royal who attracted the most rejections, and is eliminated according to this 
method. This  result  gives  us  an  initial  indication  concerning  the  existence  of  an 
eventual Condorcet winner. If one exists, it cannot be Sarkozy, because he loses in a 
direct run-off against Bayrou, as indicated by the result obtained through the Coombs’ 
method.
5. Does the Hare method respect the Condorcet principle?
Our analysis of the different procedures of the single transferable vote forms 
part of a debate on the choice of a voting system with satisfactory qualities, which 
goes back as far as the eighteenth century and the rivalry between Condorcet and 
Borda.12 The existence of Condorcet cycles  prohibits the construction of a general 
procedure  that,  beginning  with  run-offs  between  candidates,  would  allow  a 
relationship of collective preferences to be formed. Indeed, whenever a Condorcet 
cycle is present, the relationship formed by run-offs is no longer transitive. 
If the candidates cannot be ordered based on the results  of run-offs, which 
12 We  find  an  introduction  to  this  debate  in  Truchon  (1999).  For  a  more  general  view,  see 
Diamantopoulos (2004).
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candidate should be chosen? The answer proposed by Condorcet is a partial response: 
If at the very least one candidate exists, winning run-offs against each of the other 
candidates and is thus the Condorcet winner, he/she must be chosen. Consequentially, 
following Condorcet,  many Social  Choice  Theorists  consider  a satisfactory voting 
system to be one, which identifies the Condorcet winner, as long as one exists.13
In this context, it is interesting to examine if there are Condorcet cycles in the 
votes that are studied here. The specific practical details of the transferable vote allow 
us to analyze the potential presence of a Condorcet winner, and to see whether or not 
the Condorcet winner is identified via one of the two transferable vote procedures.14 If 
there is no cycle, the candidates can be ranked based on the results of run-offs against 
one other. We can therefore compare the ranking orders produced by each of the two 
vote counting methods.
To  this  end,  we  have  reconstructed  the  results  of  each  run-off  using  the 
ranking order expressed on each ballot paper. More precisely,  for any given ballot 
paper, we consider that the voter elects for candidate A in a run-off with candidate B 
if  candidate  A  is  ranked  ahead  of  candidate  B,  or  if  candidate  A  is  ranked  and 
candidate B is not. We find the results of all the run-offs in the (symmetric) matrix of 
associated vote (table 8).
Upon reading table 8, we can see that there are no Condorcet cycles which 
allow us to rank all of the candidates based on bilateral run-offs. Bayrou is the highest 
ranked, making him the Condorcet winner. He wins each of his 11 run-offs. Sarkozy 
comes next, winning 10 of his 11 run-offs (losing to Bayrou) followed by Royal, who 
is preferred in 9 out of 11 run-offs (losing to Bayrou and Sarkozy). In fourth place is 
Besancenot  with  8  victories  (he  loses  against  the  three  previous  candidates), 
confirming his good performance under the counting process of the single transferable 
vote,  as  he  finds  himself  in  the  final  four  using  both  the  Hare and the  Coombs’ 
methods. On the other hand, Schivardi loses all of his run-offs, and Le Pen wins only 
the run-off against Schivardi.
All together, the ranking of candidates using table 8 runs as follows: 
Bayrou ≻ Sarkozy ≻ Royal ≻ Besancenot ≻ Buffet ≻ Voynet ≻ Laguiller ≻ de 
Villiers ≻ Bové ≻ Nihous ≻ Le Pen ≻ Schivardi
We can compare this to the ranking  orders that use successive eliminations, 
produced  using  each  of  the  two  vote  counting  methods. The  reverse  order  of 
eliminations using the Coombs’ method is as follows:
Bayrou  ≻ Sarkozy  ≻ Royal  ≻ Besancenot  ≻ Voynet  ≻ Buffet  ≻ Laguiller  ≻ 
Bové ≻ de Villiers ≻ Nihous ≻ Schivardi ≻ Le Pen
This order is very similar to that based on the ranking of candidates using run-
offs. The Coombs’ method successfully allows the election of the Condorcet winner, 
and beyond this, it ranks the first four candidates in the same order (Bayrou, Sarkozy, 
Royal and Besancenot). There are three instances where differences between the two 
ranks  occur,  where  consecutive  candidates  swap  positions: between  Buffet  and 
Voynet, between de Villiers and Bové and, at the bottom of the list, between Le Pen 
and  Schivardi. However,  we  see  far  greater  differences  in  the  reverse  order  of 
13 See also Grofman and Feld (2004).
14 As noted above, the theory gives a partial response to the question of whether the Coombs’ method 
allows  the  Condorcet  winner  to  be  identified  when preferences  are  unimodal  (Grofman  and  Feld, 
2004). However, we can easily show that the preferences expressed in our sample are not compatible 
with unimodality. 
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eliminations expressed by the Hare method:
Sarkozy  ≻ Royal  ≻ Bayrou  ≻ Besancenot  ≻ Le Pen  ≻ Buffet  ≻ Laguiller ≻ 
Voynet ≻ de Villiers ≻ Bové ≻ Nihous ≻ Schivardi
Indeed, we now require 9 swaps between consecutive candidates to pass from 
one list to the other, with two  major changes. The first concerns Condorcet winner 
Bayrou’s ranking in only third position according to the Hare method, behind Sarkozy 
and  Royal. As  a  result  of  this,  the  Hare  method  does  not  respect  the  Condorcet 
principle. The second major difference is based on the ranking position of Le Pen. 
Despite  losing  all  bilateral  run-offs,  apart  from one  against  Schivardi,  Le  Pen  is 
ranked in fifth position according to the Hare method, just behind Besancenot. 
 Consequentially,  if  the  Coombs’  method  appears  largely  compatible  with 
preferences using bilateral votes, based on this experiment, this is not the case with 
the Hare method.
6. Conclusion
A “good” electoral system must be simple, select the Condorcet winner (if one 
exists), and should limit the possibility to manipulate as much as possible (through 
insincere voting). Based on the preferences of voters taking part in this experiment, 
we  have  shown  that  the  single  transferable  vote  can  lead  to  differing  results, 
depending on the vote counting method that is used. With the Hare method, based on 
the capacity to unite support to eliminate candidates, the winner is Sarkozy (opposed 
in a final run-off by Royal). However the Coombs’ method, based on the rejection 
level, gives victory to Bayrou (opposed by Sarkozy at the end of the process).
Whichever  vote  counting  method  is  proposed,  the  practical  details  of  the 
system  remain  the  same,  and  our  experiment  showed  that  they  do  not  form  an 
insurmountable  barrier  for  the  voters.  The  single  transferable  vote  is  therefore 
considered  to  be  a  relatively  simple  electoral  process. However,  regarding  the 
Condorcet principle, only the Coombs’ method, and its profile for identifying voters’ 
preferences, led to the Condorcet winner being elected, namely Bayrou. As for the 
Hare Method, the winner was deemed to be Sarkozy, who was equally the candidate 
to be elected by the two districts involved in the experiment in the two-round electoral 
system. Moreover,  in  this  experiment,  the  use  of  the  run-off  results  between 
candidates enables us to construct a system to rank candidates, which is much closer 
to the results of the Coombs’ method than that of the Hare method. 
In this article, we have shown that the single transferable vote (STV) responds 
well to the simplicity criteria, and it can identify the Condorcet winner, if one exists, 
as long as the adopted counting method is that recommended by Coombs (1964).
Amongst  the  research  paths,  which  we  intend  to  explore,  is  to  test  the 
hypothesis of non-monotonicity and unimodality of preferences which could, at least 
in theory, affect an electoral system’s qualities (cf. Laslier, 2004). Our topic in this 
article was not to support or condemn the current electoral system, but more modestly 
to contribute  to the Marquis of Condorcet’s recommendation in his  Mémoires sur 
l’instruction publique, according to which: “The more a population is enlightened, the 
more difficult its votes are to surprise.”
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A The Ballot Paper
O. Besancenot
M. G. Buffet
G. Schivardi
F. Bayrou
J. Bové
D. Voynet
P. de Villiers
S. Royal
F. Nihous
J. M. Le Pen
A. Laguiller
N. Sarkozy
Rules of the single transferable vote:  the voter ranks candidates in order: 
write 1 in the box next to the name of the candidate that you prefer; write 2 in the box 
next to the name of the candidate to whom you would like your vote to be transferred, 
should your first choice be eliminated; write 3 in the box next to the name of the 
candidate to whom you would like your vote to be transferred, should your first and 
second choices be eliminated, etc…
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B Official national results and aggregated results of districts 1 and 6
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C The single transferable vote: an example of vote transfer during 
the course of the vote counting process
We  include  an  example  of  one  ballot  paper,  which  ranked  all  12  candidates, 
highlighting the procedure in which votes are transferred during each repetition in the 
elimination  process,  in  this  case  using  the  Hare  method.  Using  this  method,  the 
candidates  were  eliminated  in  the  following  order:  Schivardi,  Nihous,  Bové,  de 
Villiers, Voynet, Laguiller, Buffet, Le Pen, Besancenot and Bayrou. 
Repetition
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Besancenot 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - -
Buffet 5 4 4 4 3 3 3 - - - -
Schivardi 1 - - - - - - - - - -
Bayrou 7 6 6 5 4 4 4 3 2 1 -
Bové 6 5 5 - - - - - - - -
Voynet 11 10 9 8 7 - - - - - -
De Villiers 4 3 3 3 - - - - - - -
Royal 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
Nihous 8 7 - - - - - - - - -
Le Pen 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 - - -
Laguiller 9 8 7 6 5 5 - - - - -
Sarkozy 10 9 8 7 6 6 5 4 3 2 1
The ranking presented in the first repetition corresponds to the rank that this voter 
recorded  on  his  ballot  paper.  The  following  columns  show  how  this  ranking  is 
modified as each candidate is eliminated, and therefore how his vote (rank number 1) 
is transferred from one candidate to another during the voting process. 
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D Letter sent to voters
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